In the traditional jurisprudence, it is said that there is a presumption in favor of the unreliability of conjectures (ẓ unû n), and only certain conjectures, buttressed with reliable evidence, are reliable or authoritative. Some contemporary intellectuals have challenged the unreliability of rational conjectures, believing that evidence adduced for the above claim in the traditional jurisprudence does not go through. In volumes 92 and 96 of Naqd va Nazar, an article was published by Hossein Kamkar in critique of Abolqasem Fanaeis claim and in defense of the principle of the unreliability of rational conjectures. The critic tries to establish the principle of the unreliability of rational conjectures (the claim in traditional jurisprudence), responds to Abolqasem Fanaeis objections, and raises objections against his arguments. In my view, the critics attempt to undermine Fanaei s arguments and defend the traditional jurisprudence fails, and the principle of reliability of rational conjectures (Fanaeis claim) is flawless. Drawing on a rational-analytic method, the paper seeks to show the implausibility of the claim by the traditional jurisprudence to the effect that conjectures are unreliable, and indeed the contrary is plausible and reasonable; that is, the idea that the presumption is in favor of the reliability of all conjectures except in cases where there is conclusive evidence for their unreliability. The conclusion I draw from my consideration of the two papers by Hossein Kamkar is that his objections against Fanaeis claim involve negligence of chains of transmissions and implications of hadiths and of the priority of rational evidence over transmitted evidence. I believe that the religious legislator could not rule out the reliability of rational conjectures, arguments adduced by Muslim jurists and scholars of principles of jurisprudence are not sufficiently cogent, and rational conjectures are like certitudes essentially reliable.